Capabilities and Intentions
It's possible that no one at any level in any Chinese-controlled company has the slightest intention of committing espionage ... but it doesn't matter.
What matters is that China's regime is authoritarian, undemocratic, repressive and murderous, imprisoning citizens by the million and killing them by the thousand. That this huge and increasingly wealthy nation is engaging in a massive military buildup and demonstrates clear territorial expansionism. That it has a long history of stealing technological IP or compelling companies to "share" it, ignoring other nations' patent and copyright entitlements, along with a vast espionage apparatus and a track record of penetrating rivals' computer systems. That in such a country there is no such thing as a free and separate judiciary and that any citizen or organisation can be compelled to do whatever the state orders—and remain silent about it.
The intent of Chinese organisations is irrelevant, because (a) the state's intent and control is absolutely clear and (b) the state has the capability itself, and through those people and organisations, to pursue its nefarious goals.
In any remotely sensitive context (national or corporate security, IP, business confidentiality etc) you have to be aware of capabilities first and intentions second, and in that case you simply cannot allow yourself to depend upon any Chinese-controlled entity. And "depend upon" in this context clearly means allowing data or communications of any kind to touch Chinese-controlled equipment, services or software.
The recent kerfuffle about supposed tiny spy-chips in motherboards may have been off the mark, but again, it didn't matter, because it is certainly possible for Chinese-controlled manufacturers to hide such devices in circuitry. If they had the opportunity to build spy-chips into equipment that might end up in, say western ballistic missile submarines, there is an argument that they would be foolish not to. And there are hundreds of such potential locations, ranging from government computers at the tax office to Lockheed (as if they had any secrets left) to Airbus to nuclear power stations to the national phone network.
The intentions of the Chinese government have been clear for many years. Its capabilities are now the only thing that concerns us.
So if you have a secret, or a process, that needs safeguarding—you do not use, at any point, anything that could be compromised by China.