Re: "allow an Office competitor to exist that users didn’t need to install"
And? Was really the need to "install" an office suite the problem? Moreover back then the internet technology was even lamer than today and a usable web office was even less probable.
The real reason was probably they wanted to control the whole stack and be sure IE would sustain Windows/SQL Server sales and other products for developers.
Still, they never went far as Apple forbidding to install any other browser, pay for the privilege of installing software on its OS, and forcing developers to pay MS even when they could use a different toolset for development. From these beahaviours, one can understand why they are so cozy with China - same mindset.
Quoting from a very good book about the antitrust case against Microsoft U.S. vs Microsoft- Joel Brinkley and Steve Lohr ISBN 0-07-135588-x
Page 23
At the heart of this competition-and central to the case-are browsing programs used to navigate the Internet’s World Wide Web. Netscape got an early lead in the market with its Navigator browser. What frightened Microsoft was that navigator could be used as a “platform,” a layer of software on which other programs can run. This is the main function of an operating system, a market in which Microsoft has a monopoly with Windows.
They (Microsoft) had a go at anyone who was producing anything software like.
Page 24
After a meeting with Mr. Gates in 1996, an executive with America Online, the nation’s largest on-line service, wrote to other executives in his company: “Gates delivered a characteristically blunt query: ‘How much do we need to pay you?’ “ he asked, to damage Netscape. “ ‘This is your lucky day’ “
In another case, the memos indicated that Microsoft threatened to stop selling the Apple Computer Co. a version of Microsoft's Office software suite, which holds more than 90 percent of that market -- unless Apple stopped supporting Netscape.
A central argument in the government's suit is that Microsoft has bundled its Web browser with Windows as a tactic in its war with Netscape. For the last year, at least, Microsoft has argued that the browser was added to Windows only for the benefit of customers.
In court Monday, however, the Justice Department displayed numerous internal memos indicating that the bundling was indeed a tactical decision.
This bit is particularly interesting
The memos showed that Microsoft's leaders first wanted to sell Interent Explorer and expected to earn $120 million a year from the sales. Then, when the plan to push Netscape out of competition with Microsoft failed, the company's leaders decided to bundle the browser with Windows instead as a means of helping it gain a majority share of the market.
Nothing wrong there then!
In one memo, written in December 1995 -- in the thick of Microsoft's effort to push Netscape out of the market -- Gates wrote a memo to others in the company acknowledging that Netscape was designing browser software "far better than we are."
In an interview a few months later, displayed in court Monday, Gates said: "Our business model works even if the Internet Explorer software is free. We are still selling operating systems. What's Netscape's business model look like in that case? Not very good."
The government also proffered several memos from computer manufacturers complaining bitterly about Microsoft's licensing restriction that prohibited them from offering Netscape if they wanted to offer Windows.
"We're very disappointed," Hewlett Packard wrote to Microsoft last year. "This will cause significant, costly problems. From a consumer perspective, it is hurting our industry.
"If we had another choice of another supplier, based on your actions here, we would take it."
Intel had produced some multimedia software for Windows 3.1 called N.S.P which stood for native signal processing. Microsoft was not keen with Mr Gates calling it low-quality. The enthusiastic OEMs learning of Microsoft’s dislike of the software backed away and Intel dropped it.
Page 82
“Tensions in the Intel-Microsoft relationship continued over Internet Software. For example, Intel felt that Sun Microsystems’ Java, an Internet programming language was destined to become an industry standard. So Intel had technical programs to support Java which could theoretically become a threat to the dominance of Windows someday. After a meeting with Paul Maritz, a Microsoft executive, Frank Gill an Intel executive wrote in an internal email, “Java remains a major controversy.” Intel’s support for Java, Mr Gill wrote, was viewed by Microsoft as “supporting their mortal enemy.”
Biting the hand that feeds IT
