I don't get why BGP doesn't have an inherent way to detect that such a path is dodgy
It is not in the requirements. It is however in the requirements for the system which provisions the BGP announcement in large SPs like Google and Verizon as well as filters incoming announcements.
This is a repeat of the usual idiocy of American private peering links.
In America most peering is private with secret peering policies. There are very few fat links between oligopolists and there is NO ACL on the route announcements. So if someone fat-fingers an announcement the whole system goes into meltdown. This has happened again and again and again and will continue to happen. The first time I remember was as far back as 1996? or 1997 when some small Florida SP experimenting with gated source took down most of the USA Internet for a couple of hours.
Compared to that in Europe most peering is public via peering points. Peering policies are PUBLIC and registered with RIPE in a format which is machine readable and everyone can form (and does form) an ACL on what to accept from a respective peer. As a result you get up to 3 points of enforcement: source, route server in the peering point, destination.
The issue here is - yanks never learn. Not invented here (in the great Silly Valley), hence does not exist. They keep being whacked by this on a regular basis, but continue to suffer and enjoy it.