UK Privacy Policy Screwed Up - Government Left and Right Frontal Lobes Totally Disconnected
I seem to remember one of the points Cameron/Clegg ran on as the elimination of the national ID database. And they even honoured their pledges.
Contrast that with the collection of old farts that comprise ACPO, the commercial outfit that benefits by selling government data, who announced a couple of weeks ago that they had scored GBP24,000,000 to enable it to equipment every roadside AND EVERY PRIVATELY OWNED traffic facing camera with number plate reading capability, in real time, with the data to be stored on a new computer to be housed in Hendon. This will only record number plate details and depends on the criminally minded not to switch number plates - a la James Bond.
Clarke, in addition to rendering his thoughts on rapists, also declared he thought 15 years was not an unreasonable time for the U.S. to store PNR information for 15 years.
In case any Register readers aren't concerned, consider that the following information is also collected but not shown on tickets, Numbers refer to PNR fields:
2. Date of reservation; 5. Other names on PNR; 6. Addresses; 8. Billing address; 9. Contact telephone numbers; 11. Frequent flyer information (miles flown and address(es)) (frequent flyer number might be shown on tickets); 16. Split/Divided PNR information; 17. E-mail addresses; 19. General remarks; 23. No show history; 25. Go show information (often used to note a "walk-up" passenger, i.e. someone who presents themselves without a ticket or reservation, and buys a ticket to travel immediately. Some carriers create a reservation on the spot . Other carriers simply sell them a ticket- which might be an "open" ticket, boarding them as a stand-by); 26. OSI information; 27. SSI/SSR information; 28. Received from information (the person who requested the reservation, not necessarily the traveller, e.g. a business associate, personal assistant, friend, family member, etc.); 29. All historical changes to the PNR; 30. Number of travellers on PNR; 33. Any collected APIS information.
The following data might be gleaned from tickets:
1. PNR record locator code (Tickets don't always show any record locator-the CRS record and not necessarily the same); 3. Date(s) of intended travel, airlines, dates, and flight numbers or '"open"; possibly hotel or car hire reservations, tour or cruise bookings, etc., on non-air PNR; 7. All forms of payment information; 10. All travel itinerary for specific PNR (reservations for current flight, and might include reservations for flights not yet ticketed, or ticketed separately, together with non-air components of the travellers such as accommodations, car rental or rail reservations, tours, cruises, etc.) 12. Travel agency; 13. Travel agent-IATA/ARC accreditation number, agent, etc.; 14. Code share PNR info; 24. Bag tag numbers; 34. ATFQ fields.
Register readers can no doubt determine just how invasive this information is to their own situations.
The PNR often contains additional information pertaining to car rental and hotel stays and all the associated data such as affinity cards, etc.
In reality I don't think Clarke, or the present government, has the faintest idea of what privacy is. Additionally, ACPO will undoubtedly build a case for having access to this data so Plod can track a persons movement aided and abetted by knowing cell phone information.
If you want to take some action now, you can do it by using a travel agent and requesting the agent to (1) hold all data not needed to issue a ticket on agency based contact management software; (2) Book hotels and car rental directly, on-line; (3) Use the agency as your contact address and telephone number.
15 years is one hell of a long time to hold any data.