Posts by Destroy All Monsters 16005 publicly visible posts • joined 3 Jun 2008
ALL code is deterministic, even when pseudo random numbers are used.
Or maybe you should just stop writing 15-liners that work in Helen Keller mode.
"Clouds are not traditional infrastructure".
Err yes, they are.
Seriously, are you trying to make some kind of point or do you really believe what you write?
"We show an experimental demonstration of an actual memcomputing architecture that solves the NP-complete version of the subset sum problem in only one step and is composed of a number of memprocessors that scales linearly with the size of the problem”
In other words: magic.
100 units of the currently strongest currency that this computational version of a perpetual motion machine is not going to hold up for long. Some resource is sure to increase exponentially or demand exponential precision somewhere.
Haven't thought about it yet, but lady nature doesn't like her no-go areas lifted, that's pretty certain.
The claim also seems to be that you can build an implementation of a quantum computer (which appears to NOT be able to solve problems in NP in polynomial time, see the problem class BQP) using classical microelectronics. Nein, nein,. nein.
From The New Horizons Spacecraft
"The spacecraft system architecture provides sufficient redundancy to meet this requirement with a probability of mission success of greater than 0.85."
9. Autonomy and Fault Protection
The New Horizons mission is long. The primary science goal can only be achieved after a 9.5year journey culminating in a complex set of observations requiring significant time to transmit the data to Earth. During spacecraft development, much thought and energy were devoted to fault protection. This effort continues as the operations team evaluates inflight mission performance. The fault protection architecture uses the redundancy of the spacecraft system (shown in Figure 3) if offnominal operation is detected. Basic elements of fault protection are resident in redundant elements of the PDU (power distribution unit). The PDU monitors C&DH (command and data handling) bus traffic and will automatically switch to the alternate C&DH system if it detects that nominal C&DH processor activity of the controlling system has stopped. The major elements of fault protection are implemented by software running on the controlling C&DH processor. This software is the principal component of the autonomy subsystem. The software evaluates telemetry data in real time and, based on the evaluation, takes one or more of the following actions:
1. Execute a set of commands to correct a detected fault.
2. Generate a “beacon tone” to alert operators that an event on the spacecraft requiring attention has occurred.
3. Execute one of two “go safe chain” command sets, which puts the spacecraft into either an Earth Safe or a Sun Safe state, as described in section 4 (in the event of a critical fault).
The evaluation of onboard data is performed by a set of rules that check for data that exceed defined limits for a period of time. The time period (or persistence) of the exceedance varies from rule to rule. The persistence length minimizes the chance of a rule “firing” on noisy data, or on transient data that occur during a commanded change in spacecraft pointing. Processors (other than the C&DH processor, whose activity is monitored by the PDU circuitry) are monitored via a set of “heartbeat” rules that use a telemetry point to determine if the processor is stuck at either a “one” or a “zero” state. The persistence of each of these heartbeat rules is adjusted as appropriate to match the nominal operation of the specific processor. The autonomy software can also compute dynamic limits. For example, the autonomy system monitors the propulsion system for potential propellant leaks. The system monitors the propellant as a function of both the pressure and the temperature of the fuel tank using the ideal gas law to compute a current volume and compares it to an initial value set at a previous time appropriate to the phase or mode of spacecraft operation. At the time of launch, the autonomy system used 126 rules to determine the state of health of the spacecraft.
The command sets are organized as userdefined macros and stored in memory space defined by the C&DH system. The macros can include any allowable C&DH command and can be used to power units on or off, change spacecraft modes, enable or disable autonomy rules, or execute other macros. These macros can be executed by either realtime commands or by the autonomy subsystem. The macros can also be executed by timetagged commands, allowing the commands in the macros to execute at a specific time in the future. The autonomy subsystem used 132 macros at launch. This set has been modified as the spacecraft position along its trajectory has changed and will continue to be modified as different phases of the mission occur, system performance changes, and operational experience dictates.
The capabilities of the autonomy system are used to support a number of mission operation tasks as well as providing fault protection. For example, the “command load” sequences generated by the mission operations team are loaded into one of two memory segments. Upon the completion of one sequence, an autonomy rule is used to switch to the next sequence. The autonomy rules also check to see that an appropriate sequence has been loaded into the second memory segment, and if it has not, a rule fires causing the system to enter the “go safe” chain and point to Earth.
IMO they're a nice idea in theory but in practice highly recursive code is an absolute pain to debug. Its fine it its confined to a few functions or code paths, but if the entire program is recursive from the ground up due to the language type used then no thanks, I'll steer clear.
Please explain why you think recursive code is a "pain to debug" if you don't even use said languages. Why would you even want to "debug"? Aren't you writing test code?
You may also want to explain what you mean by "recursive from the ground up". Missing the point, are you?
Furthermore someone considering functional programming "niche" must be talking from behind a stack of fanfold paper illuminated by an IBM 80-column terminal. Enjoy your conservatism. Maybe you will bum your code to use less than 20KByte eventually.
People are still faffing around with mutable state in 2015? I blame crap university courses from profs who should be taken out to pasture, retarded management in industry and a "hot shot with C++" culture of the maximum stupid. The wreckage is all around us to admire.
Mr. Nincompoop reappears: David Cameron is going to try and ban encryption in Britain
The charge of racism is directed towards the programmers for not having used enough photos of black people
So "racism" now extends to using a biased training set? Oh brave new world.
"Be offended often. It helps in not noticing the real problems."
“I am ready to abandon this tomorrow morning, but the point is that I want to secure the legal risk for the company. I want to terminate this ... but I don’t want to expose Orange to a level of risk and of penalties that could be really sizable for the company.”
It is really unacceptable that this person is calling for the destruction of Israel!
Richard apologised for the comments and travelled to Israel to build bridges.
Good. Good! Let's see you do some groveling, young Jedi!
that would take some real chutzpah
I am sure you will find that that's one of the things that is not in danger of running low in the only democracy in the Middle East.
you wrote your congressman to tell him how you wouldn't mind paying a little more for quality and astronaut safety?
Yeah, it's government all right: Just a little bit more and it will work, promise.
I wouldn't mind to see all the money for the white elephant F-35 and the Israel Safety Show in the Middle East go to space exploration. mind. But that's not up to me.
As you approach the lift to the underground lair of these codewranglers, cunningly hidden behind a large confederate battle flag, classical organ music can be faintly heard playing ....
The thought occurs that this system can also spit out a number between 0 and 1 indicating exactly how sucky the freestyling fast-delivering developer you hired last month has been so far.
PDF here: Automatic Error Elimination by Horizontal Code Transfer across Multiple Applications
1) State funnels tons of cheap money (because it's all denominated in Euro) to well-connected greek-with-a-big-ear-in-government for a decade, promises to pay it back later. European governments play ball because it's easier to play the whore than the one who says "no".
2) Life is easy, productivity is low, state is bloated, holidays are extensive, waiters are rude etc. Maybe there is still cheese to export?
3) Money pipeline stops; oh my god where is the money (now safely stashed away in private stashes) for the pensions going to come from???
4) GIVE MONEY PLOX!!
whether Google's infringement of Oracle's Java copyrights constituted "fair use."
should be
whether Google's non-infringement of Oracle's Java copyrights constituted "fair use."
Well, do they constitute "fair use"? Umm.... it can be monetized, so probably not, right?
NASA and the U.S. government really created a cluster by taking the space program semi-private as this most recent failure confirms. Russia and SpaceX are both unreliable sources to supply ISS.
Implying a perfect record by 100% state-owned socialistic outfits instead of the very mitigated record by pork barrel pumps supported by congressional mandates.
I think you need some .45 aspirin.
"NASA were serially guilty of putting PR first, and it cost Astronauts' lives."
Often quoted as fact, but actually wrong. Yes, Feynman got it wrong. He was a good physicist. That doesn't make him a good investigator of organizational problems.
Professionalism/Diane Vaughan and the normalization of deviance: The Challenger Launch Decision
Description of Normalization of Deviance
"Social normalization of deviance means that people within the organization become so much accustomed to a deviant behavior that they don't consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed their own rules for the elementary safety". People grow more accustom to the deviant behavior the more it occurs . To people outside of the organization, the activities seem deviant; however, people within the organization do not recognize the deviance because it is seem as a normal occurrence. In hindsight, people within the organization realize that their seemingly normal behavior was deviant.
The Challenger Launch Decision
Diane Vaughan developed her theory of the normalization of deviance in The Challenger Launch Decision. She details how, during the developmental phase of the Space Shuttle Program, the normalization of deviance resulted in a dangerous design flaw in the design of the spacecraft. The group that was assessing the joints on the solid rocket boosters conducted analysis to find the "limits and capabilities of joint performance. Each time, evidence initially interpreted as a deviation from expected performance was reinterpreted as within the bounds of acceptable risk". The acceptance of this risk led to the Challenger exploding on the morning of January 28, 1986.
Morton-Thiokol was contracted by NASA to manufacture the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) that were used in the Space Shuttle Program. In 1981, a problem with the putty that was used to seal the O-rings on the SRBs was discovered. When the putty was added to the boosters, bubbles formed. During take-off, the gases from inside of the SRB would go through the bubbles resulting in a "localized high temperature jet which was drilling a hole right into the O-ring". Morton-Thiokol changed the putty and the method of putty application and considered it fixed. The engineers knew that the putty erosion could still occur, but with a very low probability of a catastrophic disaster. NASA determined that the erosion of the putty was an acceptable risk of flight. NASA and Morton-Thiokol characterized the erosion as an anomaly that was to be expected since the SRBs were such a new technology. Subsequent test flights showed putty erosion that was deemed acceptable by NASA and Morton-Thiokol even though the joint actually "deviated from expected performance".
NASA and Morton-Thiokol suffered from the normalization of deviance when assessing the safety of the SRBs. Diane Vaughan states, "As [NASA and Morton-Thiokol] recurrently observed the problem with no consequence they got to the point that flying with the flaw was normal and acceptable". On January 28, 1986, the normalization of deviance within the two organizations contributed to the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger and the seven astronauts on board.
In lab experiments, the researchers at UC San Diego successfully deciphered information after it travelled a record-breaking 12,000 kilometers through fiber optic cables with standard amplifiers and no electronic regenerators.
Dude. No regenerators. Just amplifiers.
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