Tim Cook...
Playing a brave game, or a dangerous one? Answers on an encrypted post card to....
Apple isn't backing down from a move to lock down the iPhone’s data port to increase security for users, even though it means thwarting some of the password-cracking tools used by forensics experts. In the latest beta versions of iOS, Apple includes a feature called USB Restricted Mode, which disables the data connection of …
"Since cracking the six-digit passcode may take up to 22 hours (or longer for a passphrase), then brute-force methods used by the cracking tools are likely to cease to work."
Why didn't they operate a 1 hour lock-out after five (or whatever) failed attempts? Or did they and the hackers have found a way to bypass it?
You could also "hack" the RTC chip (theoretically).
Another attack is done using NAND flashing - in which the chip is backed-up at zero passcode attempts, then the iPhone is bruteforced until it gets locked out, at which the NAND is restored ... Sort of like savestates in an emulator.
It isn't clear how Cellbrite et al's PIN finder works, though presumably Apple got their hands on one at some point so you would think they should have been able to fix whatever they were doing to brute force the passcodes.
This fix is more elegant though, since 99% of the time you haven't entered your password within the last hour even if the cops get your phone while it is unlocked (or force to finger/face unlock it) the USB port will be disabled.
I have to think that the FBI is going to have a hissy fit about this - but they're going to play it coy and wait for a headline terrorist incident or school shooting investigation that is hampered by this before they do to try again to get the public on their side like they failed to do with San Bernadino.
@frank ly
Why didn't they operate a 1 hour lock-out after five (or whatever) failed attempts? Or did they and the hackers have found a way to bypass it?
I think that "found a way to bypass it" is implicit in this sentence from the article:
An analysis was undertaken by Malwarebytes in March that suggested it took advantage of undisclosed flaws in iOS.
So there's three of you who think that DJs use audio out from an iPhone instead of balanced output from a FireWire/Thunderbolt soundcard? Okaaaay
Some DJs will use an iPhone as an XY control surface (ersatz Kaos Pad) in conjunction with with other devices. Some will even take advantage of its gyros and accelerometers. Either way, its just a control device.
I think you misunderstand. A professional DJ can likely afford a dedicated device. Indeed if they're smart, that's exactly what they'd do in case some app gone rogue destroys their set.
The amateur DJs, be they playing music for themselves, their friends, or another small gathering probably don't have a separate balanced output system. They have an iDevice and speakers.
Agreed but nostalgia apart, there is/was a greater sense of theatre with a box of 12's, a pair of SL-1200s and working the crossfader on an SH-DJ1200. I was a very poor amateur but when you saw DJ Shadow or Z-Trip or DJ Hype do a vinyl set live (as I have several times over the years) it was some experience.
It's all too perfect today where you can fade in the breakdown to the thousandth of a millisecond and you can pretty much pre program your set. Even the old school DJs who have embraced the digital age still have a little xtra something to my mind as a lot of them still use it in an analog way with all the imperfections that implies.
I know, I know, rose-tinted.
Ah well I knew the days of being good with the turntables were numbered when a friend who ran a mobile DJ company showed me his latest toy - a Numark board that had two CD players with pitch control and a "mix" button. It was only a matter of time before the million monkeys took over all but the priciest venues because few patrons can tell a live performance from a computerized or pre-staged one - they might notice a blown mix but 1) not realize it means the DJ is performing live and 2) prefer the "perfect" pre-staged one anyway.
I never liked re-using the same mixes very often unless they were really something, so I was always doing something different. I'd make cassette recordings for people for $20 for whatever I happened to play during that 90 minutes. It was always fun to listen to the next day, since I was usually so drunk by the time things got really hopping I couldn't remember what I'd played. I learned some of my favorite mix combinations listening to what I'd drunkenly come up with the night before :)
Yep, it got easier and easier as technology continued to progress. I downloaded a DJ app for my iPhone a while back intending to fool around and see what it can do but never got around to it. Maybe this weekend I'll check it out now that its top of mind again.
The ironic thing is that while I correctly assessed that being a skilled DJ would matter much less when computers could do the job for you, I totally missed that a small number of DJs would be able to make millions of dollars a year in the future. Not that it would have helped me had I chosen that as a career path - it isn't about skill it is about star power. Unless Paris Hilton really is such an amazing DJ that she's worth $300,000 for a night's work!
It's less DJing now and more live "producing" now that you can essentailly have a complete recording studio on your MacBook. Layering not just effects but actual instruments over the tracks and then doing the mixdown live as you go. Be it automated or manually tweaking it with a controller. The next step is no doubt going to be an AI DJ. (shudders)
In the end the real skill of a DJ is not being able to put together a seamless mix or knowing where exactly to place the drop or being able to scratch 3 decks at once, it's simply about choosing good music to create a mood as it always has been. Be it in a hip club at 2.00am or your cousin's wedding.
Right I'm off to Discogs....
So there's three of you who think that DJs use audio out from an iPhone instead of balanced output from a FireWire/Thunderbolt soundcard? Okaaaay
And here's another, except in my case I've worked with world class DJs and plugged up the 3.5mm jack to phono cable into the mixer for them. Besides, using a balanced out when going into an unbalanced input on a DJ mixer is a bit pointless dontyathink?
I still think there is nothing better than a 10—12-character alphasymbonumeric passcode. The Adversary can try a million times a second for half a billion years and see where it gets him.
I won't rehearse the passwords again because I've said it here before. To summarise:
• Make up something ridiculous, non-dictionary and memorable because you can say it—like "sq8-Ed2ph01e" (squat-ed-to-foal)
• Make up a nemonic if you need to, e.g. a short fat guy called Ed having a baby horse: hard to forget that image once you've pictured it
• The Adversary has 12 random (to him) characters, each from among about 70 possibilities if you include upper/lower alpha, numeric and a few symbols
• That's 13,841,287,201,000,000,000,000 combinations
• To go through half of those at 1 million/sec would take just under 439 million years
I agree the system should introduce progressive latency after X failed attempts, but even if it doesn't, you can easily create a passcode which is (a) unbruteforceable and (b) resistant to errors by Apple and weaknesses in its hardware.
And Reg: FFS get a less hopelessly incompetent Captcha system.
Now repeat it over and over and you start asking, "Now was it correcthorsebatterystaple or donkeyenginepaperclipwrong?" Even with mnemonics you can get mixed up, especially if you start mixing up mnemonics.
Apologies if you've seen me bang on about this before. I figure every time it's new to a few more people. It just WORKS! My most clueless users do this with no problem.
Start with a sentence you can remember. SAY IT to yourself silently, and type every first or second letter (depends on length). Capitalize the first letter, add punctuation at the end. This method means it's not necessary to actually remember the password itself! There's no need to remember which letters were changed to what. It's stupid easy.
Example: "What we've got here is failure to communicate" (Cool Hand Luke) becomes
"Whwegoheisfatoco..."
There are no numbers and limited symbols. However it's a random string of letters that real people can actually remember and use. If there's an easier way to remember random-ish passwords, please share!
Quite.
Choose a password that isn't brute-forceable. You then never have to worry about someone brute-forcing it, or changing it either (it's now considered BAD advice to enforce regular password changes on users ).
To paraphrase the XKCD that we all know, after 20 years of effort we've trained everybody to use passwords that are easy for computers to guess and difficult for people to remember.
The only thing that matters in a password in length. That's it. Not even complexity. A long a-z-only password beats out a short, complex password basically EVERY TIME, sometimes by factors of millions or billions.
M to the power of N is much more heavily influenced by N (the number of characters in the password) than by M (the number of possibilities for each character). You don't need to get far out of stupid-password territory (8-10 characters or so) for it to always be true, even if someone decides to use the entire Unicode space as possible characters.
And if you have a password that's not brute-forceable, you don't have to worry about someone attacking your number of password attempts per second (whether time-outs are incorporated or not) past the fact that they would DoS you in even trying a million combinations a second.
Seriously, stop it and use real passwords. And avoid services that refuse to let you use longer passwords (HSBC banking stops at 12 characters, I believe) and/or which enforce ridiculous character sets on you (Apple iTunes accounts are terrible for this).
A long password with an uncommon symbols such as µ or » make it super secure as most brute forcers only tries common symbols available on the keyboard plus numbers and letter so would never crack it even if it were left running for 100s of years.
Technically true, but usually it won't work. Most systems will disallow things other than plain ASCII. Unicode and in some cases extended ASCII is out. In fact, there was one system I had to use that blocked a password using the question mark (?) symbol. Actually, it sent the password in but chopped out the question mark first, such that the original password would not work but the one with the mark excised would. Great job there. Rather than allowing a system to get confused, I tend to go for length plus a few punctuation marks; that way, nobody can just brute force the alphabet to get it.
I also had experience with a system that accepted numerical characters in some fields (user name and surname) when they had a typo... but of cause refused them in the login field. I was only paid to answer the phone... so my efforts to fix that obviously broken system were to transfer the call.
Not quite correct, if the password is alphanumeric and an actual word or combination of words, dictionary based attacks drastically shorten the time to "guess". If a single word length is possibly even a negative as the number of words at a given length reduces past beyond about 8 letters. Combinations of words are harder but still have the drawback of being drawn from a very limited subset of the possible combinations of words.
Using first letters of words from phrases also has weaknesses as the letters are drawn from typically a very limited subset of possible combinations. If the pass phrase is long enough this may be mitigated, but only truly random combinations require random searches and are subject to the combination rules.
And of course "truly random" combinations are very much harder to remember.
Just FWIW
> Combinations of words are harder but still have the drawback of being drawn from a very limited subset of the possible combinations of words.
If using words in a password, each word is the equivalent of a single character in a random character password. But that actually expands the set of characters when compared to an ASCII character set at least. Below is a copy-paste of a post I wrote a few weeks ago about using dictionary words, note that it was based on using 5 words (not just 1) as a password. I will preface it by saying that I think it is not practical to use, as while theoretically the set is quite large, what's the chances anyone would use the long words (say 6+ characters) in their combination of words? But in theory:
The Oxford English Dictionary has ~171,000 'active' words in it (it has an additional 41k obsolete words and some other types).
So, a 5 word phrase would have complexity of 171000^5, or a complexity of:
146,211,169,851,000,000,000,000,000
And this assumes that every letter is typed in in the same case, no mixed case.
A 10-character password using the printable characters usually found on an English-based QWERTY keyboard is, umm, roughly 49 keys, each with 2 characters, for 98 combinations.
So it'd be 98^10 which is a complexity of:
81,707,280,688,754,689,024
Which is significantly less complex than 5 random words.
You'd need a difficult to remember password of 14 random characters to exceed the difficulty of an easier to remember 5 random words password.
Of course, you may be able to increase the set of characters above 98 by using a larger UTF character set.
But then, you could increase the set of words by including non-english words, or using techniques others have discussed like misspellings, mixed case, replacing alphabetic characters with other characters, and so on.
Spanish has around 88k words, depending on how you count them (some sources say there are many more), German, again depending on how you count the words and which sources you use, has at the low end about 140,000, and another 100k or more for french.
So if we add those 4 dictionaries (English, Spanish, French and German) we've increased our word set to 469k, so:
469000^5 =
22,691,552,673,349,000,000,000,000,000 combinations.
Using first letters of words from phrases also has weaknesses as the letters are drawn from typically a very limited subset of possible combinations.
Assuming, of course, that the attacker knows you have used this method.
What you describe is correct for a specific known password mnemonic method. However, an attacker typically has no way to determine which method the user might have employed to create the mnemonic. Or, in fact, that the user even employed such a method at all.
if the password is alphanumeric and an actual word or combination of words, dictionary based attacks drastically shorten the time to "guess" [blah blah blah]
Sigh.
Arguments like this are just handwaving without some actual statistics, or at least back-of-the-envelope approximations.
A recent version of the aspell US English dictionary contains around 204800 words. Using an xkcd-style four-word phrase (which gives a passphrase on the order of 20 characters, quite easy to type reliably for many users; I routinely use passphrases twice that long) gives about 70 bits of entropy. That's assuming words are chosen with equal distribution from the list; it assumes nothing about, say, the per-symbol entropy of English.
Note it also assumes the passphrase contains no spacing, punctuation, or non-letter symbols, except the ones that appear in the aspell US-English dictionary (things like apostrophe and hyphen). Those can easily be added by the user in a meaningful fashion, increasing the entropy. It also assumes monocase, or a case-insensitive verification mechanism; if the system is case-sensitive, we can use mixed case as well.
What's 70 bits of entropy worth? Compare it with a random (equal distribution) password drawn from mixed-case English letters, numerals, and a dozen non-alphanumerics. That's 64 symbols, or 6 bits of entropy per symbol. So 70 bits of entropy for the passphrase is just shy of a 12-character password using this scheme.
If you can make a million attempts per millisecond, brute-forcing a 70-bits-of-entropy passphrase takes a little under 19 thousand years, on average.
The trick with xkcd-style bag-of-words passwords is to generate a number of unbiased phrases from the dictionary, then pick one you can remember by visualization, "newspaper headline" interpretation, or whatever. The relatively low per-symbol and per-word entropy of natural language really doesn't matter when it comes to resistance to brute forcing, once the phrase gets to be even a few words long. Models only do well against plausible natural-language phrases.
There's a commonplace among infosec folks that xkcd-style passphrases are not particularly strong. Schneier subscribes to it in this post, for example, talking about the password-cracking bake-off Ars Technica hosted back in 2013. But it's not the scheme itself that's broken. The weakness comes from weak use of it - from users choosing words from too small a dictionary,1 or creating passphrases that are too small.
(Also, the Ars piece only worked with one attack mode - cracking a corpus of unsalted MD5 hashes. While Schneier generalizes that to "password crackers know to combine words from their dictionaries", even with smarter candidate generation, stronger key-derivation functions such as Argon2 are going to slow brute-forcing tremendously.)
Even then, terms like "broken", "weakness", and "too small" are misleading. Absolutes are always inaccurate when discussing security. What we need to talk about is the risk (probable loss) under a threat model. My probable loss for someone brute-forcing my Reg password is very low - I don't have much at risk here, under my threat model. And the probability of someone brute-forcing it is relatively low, because most attackers have little incentive to do so. So my password only has to be strong enough against brute-forcing to lower that risk to a point that I'm comfortable with.
1Generally that means "user has a larger dictionary, but only chooses familiar words, and has a relatively small working vocabulary in the first place". For a random-word-phrase scheme, the user's "dictionary" is the set of words they're willing (with high probability) to use.
@Tikimon - "it's a random string of letters"
Wrong!
"Start with a sentence you can remember."
This isn't a random start to the process, the following steps are deterministic, so the output is not random. Meaningful sentences in any language will have some statistical pattern to the initial letters. Worse, a memorable sentence is likely to be a quote, so the password crackers will drop a dictionary of quotations into their process if this becomes popular.
So, if you are using this scheme, the last thing you want is for everyone else to be using the same scheme... Therefore, you aren't using this, and you're a spook who has worked out how to crack this easily, hey, are those black helicopet//
If there's an easier way to remember random-ish passwords, please share!
Use passphrases rather than passwords. Cognitively-normal humans are very good at remembering quite long sequences of meaningful natural-language expressions.
That said, all of this stuff - generation and mnemonic techniques for passwords and passphrases - has been studied and discussed extensively for decades. There's a huge corpus of literature about it, and I'd be shocked if anyone posts anything novel on the subject here. Anyone actually interested in the subject would be better off doing a bit of research (try this new-fangled "world wide web" thing) than bullshitting about it on Reg forums.
Of course, bullshitting on the forums is usually more a socialization activity than any attempt at serious inquiry. Where that's the case, carry on by all means.
Even with mnemonics you can get mixed up
Certainly, the user can get mixed up. Whether that's a significant risk depends quite a lot on the user in question and the scheme being employed. To reject passphrase mnemonics in general because a few schemes don't work for a few users is pure foolishness.
Security is always about the economics of risk. If a given user can employ a passphrase + mnemonic that greatly reduces the possibility of brute-forcing1 while only slightly increasing2 the possibility of forgetting the credentials, that's a net gain for defenders.
On the other hand, compressing and mapping sufficiently-long passphrases simply to use a larger alphabet, as suggested by the OP, generally isn't worthwhile. You can get sufficient entropy with normal natural language use, even given the low per-symbol entropy of readable text. The exceptions are crap authentication systems with too-tight restrictions on passphrase length and character set, and crap authentication systems that require a large alphabet rather than estimating entropy. In the latter case, though, it's still usually possible to use readable text rather than compress-and-map tricks.
1And possibly of other attacks, depending on the verification mechanism, resources available to the attacker, etc.
2Or not increasing at all, since there's ample evidence to show that in general people are better at remembering mnemonic schemes than they are at remembering even short random sequences. That's why they call them "mnemonic".
Ok, not mine. But there have been some nifty applications using an iPhone, a continuous glucose monitor and an insulin pump to automate some of the rigmarole T1 diabetics have to go through. Which means not having to wake up regularly to check glucose levels & correct with insulin doese to avoid hypos and death. Which allows them to get a decent night's sleep and avoid inconvenient things like hypos and comas. If you google 'Artificial Pancreas', there are quite a few examples, including using USB as a safety/security feature to prevent WiFi problems.
So presumably apps like that will also stop working.. Unless app devs grease the Apple and pay to licence a feature that allows them to bypass the proprietary port locking..
No serious DJ's are using any iOS devices in their live setup.
Most are using MacBook Pros for the I/O ports, larger screens, greater storage capacity, and processing power to run a variety of software and hardware controllers.
It's also pretty rare to find a decent controller that is compatible, and when most clubs have a controller that any laptop can be connected to, it would be stupid to use iOS devices, because they'd have to lug around their controller to all their gigs.
Nobody uses just iDevices, but they are common as part of a setup. They're not typically used to output audio though - there are external DACs with a variety of balanced outputs for that, usually from the MacBook as you say. The low latency and compatibility with legacy standards (eg wireless MIDI) make iPads good control surfaces. A multi-touch screen offers a better UI for some applications (eg a virtual mixing desk) than a MacBook does.
DJs use a variety of gear, some just using two turntables and a cross-fader, others using time-stamped vinyl to control digital music, others a Kaos pad or other XY pad to apply effects in real time.
Not everyone is serious. At one point I was looking at a controller that controlled the Djay app, because it works with Spotify. There is a whole class of such cobtrollers. Audio comes from the iPad and the controller talks to the iPad via USB. Not sure how this affects it.
"Law enforcement and security teams are unlikely to be the only people affected. iPhone peripherals have industrial and medical uses - and DJs had better not wander too far from the decks"
Surely any owner who wants to allow an ongoing data connection will simply disable the 'disconnect after an hour' function?
That may be an inconvenience but not much of a problem. Apple could even arrange for a pop-up to remind users that they will be disconnected if they don't change settings whenever they connect to hardware which desires a persistent connection.
Yep. I was going to say the same thing. This seems to provide extra security for those who want it (law enforcement aren't the only ones who might want to try cracking into a phone) with the option to disable it for those who'd find it inconvenient. Seems like a good feature to me.
If our current cops had been around in the past, they would be complaining about people putting locks on their doors and demanding Master Keys to bypass them. Also demanding that houses be built with spy ports in the walls (which only the cops would use, hehehe) because people use curtains and shutters on their windows.
The US Constitution was deliberately written to protect us from that kind of intrusion, and the cops/spooks are determined to ignore and destroy those rights. Gosh, I wonder why nobody likes or trusts the government anymore?
>The US Constitution was deliberately written to protect us from that kind of intrusion, and the cops/spooks are determined to ignore and destroy those rights
Maybe learn from the Declaration of Independence:
"deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government"
After all, that's why y'all have so many guns
No matter what scheme you come up with now for devising passwords at some point will be crackable.
Ultimately, the cracking of passwords comes down to the N vs NP problem. for those who may not be aware of the N vs NP problem, It asks if a problem whose solution can be quickly verified can also be solved quickly. At the moment, it cant. There is still a prize available of $1M for anyone who can solve the problem. I suspect the prize for anyone who does crack it could be worth a lot more as it will essentially break every password.
Current computing can only break passwords by bruit force, but with the rise of quantum computers, neural network and AI I am sure that there is be someone working on N vs NP.
As for cracking passwords made up from the first two letters of a quote or saying with added punctuation, it wouldn't be too hard to scrape all the movie quotes from imdb, then do a list of just the first two letters of the quotes then use that as a word list with a combo of punctuation. So, you will need to use a more complex series of punctuation marks to be "safe" if you use a move quote.
passwords alone are not safe*, you need two factor and I bet in the future that's going to be three factor.
* safe is relative, for a web forum, a password will do you fine, but online banking needs 2 factor ....at least
boffin, because it wont be for long !!
No matter what scheme you come up with now for devising passwords at some point will be crackable.
Handwaving bullshit. A completely untestable and thus vapid claim.
Ultimately, the cracking of passwords comes down to the N vs NP problem.
Your argument might be a little more persuasive if you knew that the name of this problem is "P versus NP", not "N versus NP". But probably not, so I wouldn't worry about it too much.
Your (corrected) claim is common, but it's also wrong. Even if P=NP (very unlikely), there are still functions with asymmetric effort, where both F and F-bar (its inverse) are in P but F-bar has a worse polynomial growth rate.
for those who may not be aware of the N vs NP problem, It asks if a problem whose solution can be quickly verified can also be solved quickly.
No, it really doesn't. The P-versus-NP problem asks whether a particular (isomorphic) class of functions that are poly-time verifiable also have a poly-time solution. Polynomial time is not necessarily "quick".1
Even with large-scale general quantum computing and problems that are also in BQP, functions of this sort generally only get a square-root improvement on running time. So you double the length of the "hash".
It's true that passwords are terrible authenticators, under pretty much any metric other than ease of implementation and familiarity. And passphrases really aren't that much better. And yes, multiple authenticators (preferably weighted N-of-M authentication, not the sort of half-assed 2FA or 1.5FA we typically see) looks like the only viable direction to go, given the current IT landscape. But trying to derive those conclusions from P-vs-NP is cargo-cult analysis.
1Matt Scala had a good example of this once: he derived and proved an algorithm, for an actual problem he was working on, which had a best-case polynomial time with a huge exponent. It's in P, but completely unusable for non-degenerate cases.
"...disables the data connection of the iPhone’s Lightning port after a given time, while allowing it to continue to charge the device."
You know the aftermarket $2-each eBay Lightning charging cables with the stolen DRM key that has since been revoked by Apple for the sole purpose of imposing their tax. Presumably they'd need a "data connection" to check the Key (which is data) in the DRM chip embedded into the Lightning charging cable.
So does this mean that those unlicensed Lightning charging cables would start to actually work again after not working for an hour?
Probably not. The phone will refuse to send any data or accept input from the connection, but it can still read the chip. Even if it does use the same bus, I don't think you can put something on the USB end to get it to trust the cable, because the chip is read directly. So the cables will most likely remain broken.
Just me who thinks that, if your investigation hinges on the evidence contained in a phone you can't unlock, then you don't have enough OTHER evidence? Surely there need to be two or more pieces of independently verifiable corroborative evidence to conclusively prove a crime "beyond reasonable doubt"? In that case, why do the FBI and/or (fukda) polis so desperately need this?
While the public focus has been on criminal convictions, there are at least two other major uses for this data. 1) To stop a crime in progress. That is, to reveal the location of stolen goods or kidnapped individuals. 2) To disrupt criminal organizations. The utility of this information can be tremendous.
The utility of having an effective privacy right against the government by the citizens is several orders of magnitude greater, however.
The utility of this information can be tremendous.
The utility of having an effective privacy right against the government by the citizens is several orders of magnitude greater, however.
Well said. Some time back I saw a presentation by a US ADA about the use of phone data in a number of actual investigations, including what was gathered and what permission (warrant, subpoena, nothing) was required to get it. The focus on cases like San Bernardino doesn't do a good job of representing the whole picture.
In a civil society there's always a complex trade-off between civil rights and law enforcement. Reasonable people will disagree on what that trade-off should be. Personally, I favor strong privacy rights, but I don't believe that position is prima facie correct.
Nope. You may commit any crime, and then simply grind your phone to dust and you'll never be convicted. ;-)
My evil plan is to steal a used & full vacuum cleaner bag from the local shopping mall's janitor. I'll sprinkle its contents across my crime scene, to give the forensic investigators something to do.
It's hard to get over the whole walled garden thing, though.
Honestly, it's not the BFD that people make it out to be. I got very tired of the wild wild west of the Play Store: relentless permission creep, apps able to use other methods (such as view wifi networks) to geolocate me after I'd turned off location services, "no permission" apps that could download and execute malicious payloads, etc. And, of course, Google's own relentless slurp. It made me weary, and I don't miss it at all.
To be fair though, given the data transfer speeds now, there would have to be something seriously wrong to take close to an hour to transfer 250 Gb of data via a lightening port.
I've only done this with a 128 Gb device and that takes say 10 minutes or so. Downloading from an iCloud backup across a slow wifi network could do it I guess. Would just take the input of the pass code to continue.
It might be a minor inconvenience if you know the passcode - it's really aimed at people who don't know that code but who are trying to find it out.
Depends on what is actually implemented.
The idea is that if the police / some criminals take away your locked phone, then they can't unlock it using some hardware connected through USB after an hour. So they'd have to be quite quick.
When you do a backup, your phone isn't locked. Since the whole reason is to stop miscreants from unlocking your phone, there is no need for any measures when your phone is already unlocked.
My solution to this problem, while slightly less secure, is to cut off data transfer an hour after it stopped already. Therefore, anything that you started with proper access goes to completion just fine, and an hour after that, the lock goes into effect. This also means that someone who has a device they want to continue to have access can do that because the connection remains live and has to die for an hour before the lock engages. This does mean that if there was a data transfer less than an hour before the police try to get into the device, then their device can brute force all it likes because the transfer can't be interrupted. However, given the relative rarity of people actually using hardware data transfer with phones, this probably isn't a big deal. Also, under this system, I'd probably reduce the time to about ten minutes.
"I wonder what would happen to Apple's policy if their executives were hauled before the courts for aiding and abetting criminal and terrorist activities."
That would require going to court to prove that such activities did actually depend on the phones being lockable. The risk would be failure to prove that to a court's satisfaction, blowing up all the PTB's arguments in their face. That's a risk they're unlikely to take.
No problem with them doing that so long as the same logic applies to the exec's of, say, Colt, Browning etc. Hell even Ford (for the getaway car), and Yale (for the locks on their safe house)
For some reason, IT seems to have a higher standard-of-responsibility for end user actions.
Let me guess, you're one of those "if you have nothing to hide" idiots who has no problem giving away your freedom if it makes you a little less fearful of all the Bad Guys you're scared are out to get you?
Not sure why this change would be "aiding and abetting terrorists" but making iMessage use encryption or allowing people to put a password on their GMail account isn't - those also make the FBI's job more difficult...
I hate Apple & their **** walled garden. I hate their aggressive liberal politics. I hate their marketing shtick.
And I would go ape if they were so charged.
There are real limits to how much bs a government can pull before the citizens reach their limit. Such a stunt would cross mine.
That would make it kind of hard to connect to a computer, since the phone is going to go to sleep (and lock) after a minute or two.
The one hour delay isn't a problem because it starts from the time you last unlocked your phone with a password. It has been at least a couple days since I last unlocked my X (supposedly you need to unlock with a password every 48 hours to re-enable Touch ID / Face ID, but I find it sometimes goes longer so I'm not sure exactly how this works)
That means if the FBI broke down my door right now, and grabbed it out of my hands just after I had picked up my phone and unlocked it with my face, even if they had a Cellbrite machine with them and plugged it in immediately it wouldn't work. They'd have to get lucky and raid me within an hour of the time I last typed in the password, and then only have the remaining part of that hour left. i.e. I unlocked it with a password 45 minutes ago, they have 15 minutes to try to brute force my password. And good luck to them, because it is a password not a passcode so the Cellbrite won't work for them anyway!
hardware limiting the data rate for password/pin entry ?
It would require the security portal to be separate from your bulk data, with countermeasures to avoid simply bypassing it, but if its only even looking at 2 to 5 entries per second then brute-forcing loses its brute-yness without affecting manual entry.
Personally I think this should be a requirement for all password checks.
...a debate about whether Apple should install backdoors for forensics teams to access data on iPhone quickly –in this case, specifically on the iPhone of the shooter, who killed 14 people in the attack. A judge decreed it should, but Apple CEO Tim Cook refused, with the firm saying the nation's "founders would be appalled".
I have no respect at all for the dreary old wankers who founded that country, but I really, really doubt that.
Goes double for Abraham Lincoln.