As someone who strongly advocated against the government's mathematically illiterate magic fairy unbreakable but yet somehow still possible to assist in breaking when receiving a magical signed order, can I express relief that at least on this proposal they managed to see what a stupid idea it is.
Use a pen!!!!
Apparently they were worried about invisible ink
"Although saying that, I know some pedantic commentard is going to prove to me you can."
First result when I searched for 'Erasable Pens' https://www.tesco.com/groceries/en-GB/shop/home-and-ents/stationery/pens/erasable-pens
You can rub out a pencil, but you can still see where the mark was made.
Who is going to rub out a pencil mark anyway - the advantage of the paper system is that the paper is put in a sealed box, watched by multiple interested parties. Then the box is transported (still watched) to a counting location where it is unsealed (watched) and the ballots counted (still being watched).
We've had a long time, and much practise at this kind of thing, and many attacks have been tried... they have countermeasures in place...
You mention the most important thing here a couple of times, but let me stress it:
Observability by ordinary citizens is the key advantage of paper voting. It maintains trust, and maximizes the number of eyeballs verifying the ballot. I volunteered at polling stations and always had huge respect for the people who came in around closing, sat down, and just observed us counting votes. That is democracy in action - for everybody, by everybody, and people who think that this should be taken away and replaced by machines are not to be trusted. Nothing is gained, and a lot is lost.
Exactly. Paper ballots are auditable (i.e. recountable). It is VERY difficult to devise a paper-free scheme that can be sorted out after the vote if (i.e. when) something goes wrong with the vote tallying.
Fortunately for those elsewhere, we here in the US have tried the experiment of embracing electronic voting without really thinking through the consequences. The bottom line: Generally electronic voting works, but there are lots of ways it can fail. And once it fails it can be really difficult to sort things out. If they can be sorted out.
What does seem to work reasonably well is paper ballots that are machine read and tallied electronically. If the tallying process breaks down somehow or questions arise about the integrity of the count, the ballots can be counted by hand
> Who uses a pencil to cast their vote? Use a pen!!!! You can't rub out a pen.
If you are planning to subvert an election by changing the votes, do you:
(A) Open up the ballot box, pull out an eraser, carefully rub off all the marks, then renumber them according to your evil plans; or
(B) Print out new ballot forms and then number them according to your evil plans;
(In both cases you need to figure out how to stuff those faked ballots into the box).
Security is not the issue
Solving the security of internet-based elections is near trivial (I said "near"):
1) Issue a unique code to every voter by paper mail or relatively safe electronic means (the security of the election process does not depend on the secrecy or integrity of this delivery method)
2) When voting, the voter records the issued code and casts the vote, again using a relatively safe electronic method (the security of the election process does not depend on the secrecy or integrity of this method either)
3) Upon publishing the results, the total list of issued codes and their recorded vote is published, allowing every voter who cares to both validate that
a) their vote is correctly recorded
b) the totals are correct
c) the total number of votes cast matches what would be expected
Of course, this would put a lot of consultants out of a job and obliterate the russia-scare politics and what have you, so no politician in their right mind would consider a system such as this.
However, what surprises me is that nobody cares about the secrecy of the vote. This is something no internet based system can provide. Going to a booth in privacy ensures that you cast your vote as you please without being coerced by peers, family or anyone else to put your mark at any particular place.
This, as I see it, is the reason internet elections cannot possibly make sense. It has absolutely nothing to do with the technical security of the system and hackers and Putin - it is a simple matter of ensuring that voters exercise their free will when voting and nothing else.
At least that's my 0.02 DKK (because my peers voted not to get the Euro) on that issue.
Re: Security is not the issue
"This, as I see it, is the reason internet elections cannot possibly make sense. It has absolutely nothing to do with the technical security of the system and hackers and Putin - it is a simple matter of ensuring that voters exercise their free will when voting and nothing else."
Re: Security is not the issue
>>>(the security of the election process does not depend on the secrecy or integrity of this delivery method)<<<
Yes it does, the list of individual voter codes getting into the wrong hands due to a poor delivery method would be a disaster. It's a secret ballot to prevent widespread intimidation & retribution.
Any electronic voting system has 2 problems that cannot be removed.
(1) it will be a hacking target for any number of groups more interested in a specific result than democracy.
(2) it will either be possible to identify individual voters or not possible to verify the result if contested.
Paper voting allows
(1) visible easily verified counting - numerous observers.
(2) multiple recounts by different people if needed
(3) simple destruction of ballots - 1 year after the decision is declared to allow reasonable time for any problems to be highlighted.
Would an "informal vote" still be possible?
In Australia, voting is compulsory and you have to number the candidates in order of preference. If your first choice is eliminated then you're deemed to have voted for your next choice, and so on. In a (quite likely) situation where most or all of the candidates are so repulsive that you don't want them to get your vote under any circumstances, then you have the option of spoiling your ballot paper (known as "informal voting"). That way, you can stop your vote going to someone you despise, without being fined for not voting. "Informal voting" is not actually illegal, but it's illegal to encourage anyone to do it. In any case, it should be (hopefully) impossible to trace a spoiled ballot paper back to an individual.
This may seem a waste of a vote, but I've several times been in a situation where I could not, with a clear conscience, endorse any of the candidates. Since the number of informal votes is published, it's a good way of telling the candidates that you don't think any of them deserves your vote. I'm worried that this will no longer be possible with electronic voting. Any attempt to vote "none of the above" will be rejected, and you would be fined for not voting. I suspect that there will be some combination of button pushes which would register as an informal vote, but that it would be illegal to tell anyone how to do it.
Re: Would an "informal vote" still be possible?
To solve that problem the last item on the paper should be a vote for 'non of the above' which makes it a legal choice. I think that would never be allowed because the politicians are afraid of rejection - they are very insecure at voting time.
Re: Would an "informal vote" still be possible?
I have been saying this for years now (possibly even decades). Not only should there be a 'none of the above' but if that selection gets the highest count then no candidate is elected and they have to try again in one year.
That would really cause a sphincter moment amongst the politicians as currently no matter what you do, one of them boards the gravy train.
Pencils don't leak when stored
We use a pencil because they are easier than pens to store for the long period between elections. If that worries you, well you are permitted to use your own writing device to mark the ballot.
Voter ID will almost certainly disenfranchise everyone living in remote areas. Very few people have their issued documents (birth certificates and so on) and getting replacements when the mail takes three weeks and is based on addresses rather than names isn't straightforward.
A lot of the posts here have poor familiarity with Australia's polling process. The idea that you'd be able to open a ballot box and fiddle with the contents is a little unrealistic. So pencil marks are fine. It's well worth volunteering to be a scruitineer at least once in your life. It is eye opening to see the degree to which Australian elections are secure.
There's little fraud. Partly because the compulsory voting means that the real voter will also present themselves, leading to fraud being quickly discovered. Australian's aren't upset by being forced to appear on a Saturday to vote. They are upset when being forced to appear on a Saturday to vote and then being told they voted twice. That's the sort of anger which leads people to give their full cooperation to the Federal Police, and then not letting the Police slack off.
The undermining of out voting process is really happening through the postal voting system. For example, by political parties putting themselves forward as the agency to approach to obtain the postal voting papers through. The wide range of reasons for postal voting is also too broad: eg, employers should be forced to release people for voting, rather than those staff seeking a postal vote. Postal voting means that incidents close to the election date have less influence then they ought to. You'll remember it was only days before the first ACT election that it started to be known that the leading party was a pack of new right loons. The recent by-election in Wentworth would have been much less close if there were less postal voting, as noted by former PM Turnbull.