Google-backed solar electricity facility sets itself on fire

Re: Predicting Problems

The mirror(s) pointing upward would be safe, too. (See post above. Okay, sunglasses wouldn't hurt.) This could be achieved by adding a counterweight - in case of power failure all mirrors tilt upward thanks to gravity. If one or several mirrors stop tracking correctly, pull the plug on them - mirrors tilt upwards.

Re: Supply commitments?

"Fukushima was a catastrophe in terms of the PR it caused (e.g. Frau Merkel's knee-jerk) but in every other sense I think it was a triumph for nuclear safety."

Rubbish. The tsunami closed Fukushima down, but it should either already have had additional protective measures to mitigate known risks (additional to those originally incorporated into the design), or have already been closed down *because* of the additional known risks. It was a *disaster* in the sense that it showed nuclear regulation in Japan wasn't working - the additional risks had been simply ignored, as had TEPCO's unsatisfactory operational practices.

TEPCO had already had their wrists slapped by the (ineffective) regulator on a number of occasions, for things including neglecting the scheduled maintenance of the diesel powered backup generators.

It was already known that Fukushima was at excessive risk of sea water overtopping the sea defences (the walls were unrealistically low), and it was also known that when that happened, the station would likely be uncontrollable (no incoming electricity, backup generators inoperable due to sea water - the backup generators were at low level, etc).

There's more but ICBA. A much longer writeup can be found at

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/fukushima.pdf - extract below.

These things could have been properly addressed. To do so would have cost money, but not lives. Therefore they weren't properly addressed. See any problem with that?

"At the time of the accident, critical safety systems in nuclear power plants in some countries, especially in European states, were—as a matter of course— much better protected than in Japan. Following a flooding incident at Blayais Nuclear Power Plant in France in 1999, European countries significantly enhanced their plants’ defenses against extreme external events. Japanese operators were aware of this experience, and TEPCO could and should have upgraded Fukushima Daiichi.

Steps that could have prevented a major accident in the event that the plant was inundated by a massive tsunami, such as the one that struck the plant in March 2011, include:

• Protecting emergency power supplies, including diesel generators and batteries, by moving them to higher ground or by placing them in watertight bunkers;

• Establishing watertight connections between emergency power supplies and key safety systems; and

• Enhancing the protection of seawater pumps (which were used to transfer heat from the plant to the ocean and to cool diesel generators) and/or constructing a backup means to dissipate heat.

Though there is no single reason for TEPCO and NISA’s failure to follow international best practices and standards, a number of potential underlying causes can be identified. NISA lacked independence from both the government agencies responsible for promoting nuclear power and also from industry.

In the Japanese nuclear industry, there has been a focus on seismic safety to the exclusion of other possible risks. Bureaucratic and professional stovepiping made nuclear officials unwilling to take advice from experts outside of the field. Those nuclear professionals also may have failed to effectively utilize local knowledge. And, perhaps most importantly, many believed that a severe accident was simply impossible.

In the final analysis, the Fukushima accident does not reveal a previously unknown fatal flaw associated with nuclear power. Rather, it underscores the importance of periodically reevaluating plant safety in light of dynamic external threats and of evolving best practices, as well as the need for an effective regulator to oversee this process."

Re: Supply commitments?

Your argument that the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima are not all that serious is disingenuous for an obvious reason. Unlike explosions or extremely poisonous chemicals, radiation kills slowly (unless it is extremely high), which means that there is usually sufficient time to evacuate the population near an accident site. There are few direct health casualties precisely because of the evacuation and precautions to limit exposure. It is perverse to then claim that the problem is exaggerated because so few people die!

That does not mean there are no casualties of a different sort: large areas are rendered uninhabitable for very long periods of time and there are substantial financial and personal losses, especially if the site is near high population densities, or near food production areas.